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THE INCREASINGLY ANACHRONISTIC CASE
AGAINST SCHOOL VOUCHERS
IRA C. LuPu*

My father spent the last ten weeks of his life in St. Peter's
Hospital in Albany, New York. Neither he nor his family had
directly selected this hospital; rather, he was there as a result of
his physician's admitting privileges. A small Crucifix hung on
the wall of every room in which he received treatment. Catholic
priests, as well as clergy from other denominations, frequently
dropped into rooms at St. Peter's to see if patients needed
prayers or other words of comfort. My father was Jewish, and he
had not led a religiously observant life, but his childhood experience had brought him close to Catholic clergy.1 In my presence
(and, to my knowledge, throughout his stay), he welcomed the
prayers of the priests he encountered at St. Peter's. My father
was Medicare-eligible, and the United States eventually paid a
very substantial sum to the hospital for the medical care he
received in the concluding period of his life.
No Religion Clause scholar or advocate of whom I am aware
would argue that government payment to St. Peter's Hospital for
the cost of medical service for my father's benefit violated the
Establishment Clause. Yet, this expenditure obviously contributed to the financial well-being of a sectarian institution. My
father's Medicare eligibility permitted him to utilize, without
charge to him, the services of that institution, and those services
were rendered in a sectarian religious environment. Indeed, his
vulnerability at that moment made him unusually susceptible to
the religious influences in that setting, although he was in no way
compelled to respond to those stimuli.
* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School. Thanks to Bob Tuttle for very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this piece, and to Julia Lee, of the Class of
2000 at the Law School, and Chris Reed, of the Bums Law Library at George
Washington, for research help in the preparation of this essay.
1. At the age of four, my father was misdiagnosed as having an incurable
illness, and his impoverished Jewish parents sent him to a charity hospital run
by an order of the Catholic Church. He spent the ages of four through seven in
that hospital and was attended to each day by Catholic nuns. For the rest of his
life, despite continuing Jewish family ties, he displayed little attachment to
Judaism, but reacted with energy and enthusiasm whenever he encountered
members of Catholic religious orders.
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Why are these arrangements uncontroversially accepted in
the community of Religion Clause scholars, while comparable
arrangements involving elementary and secondary school students produce so much controversy? Why do many of our citizens think that school vouchers and medical vouchers are so
different in their constitutional significance?
Impressionability alone cannot sustain the distinction; at the
end of life, and in all times of grave illness, hospital patients may
be quite as impressionable as young students. Either medical
vouchers are constitutionally questionable when they may be
used at sectarian hospitals, or the constitutional case against
school vouchers cannot effectively be sustained.2 After years of
wrestling with the question, I have come to the conclusion that
the constitutional case against school vouchers is extremely weak;
indeed, in this article, I question the force of the constitutional
case against direct state aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools. The arguments against vouchers-usually characterized as indirect aid to sectarian schools because families are an
intervening force between the state and these schools-and the
arguments against direct aid rest on precedents and policies
whose contemporary relevance has dwindled dramatically.
The anti-voucher case essentially rests on three legs, each of
which is analyzed in separate parts of this essay. The first, discussed in Part I, emphasizes the difference between forbidden,
direct aid and permissible, indirect aid by government to religious institutions,3 and suggests that voucher arrangements are
really direct aid in disguise. The second leg, probed in Part II,
rests primarily on the asserted non-neutrality of voucher arrangements; that is, it rests on the argument that voucher programs
favor religion. The third, building upon the first two, goes to the
heart of the matter-it purports to explain precisely why direct
aid by the government to religious institutions, performing functions of secular value, is forbidden even if that aid is part of a
religion-neutral program. The core argument against direct aid,
evaluated critically in Part III, stands upon the case law from Everson v. Board ofEducation4 to Lemon v. Kurtzman' and their progeny

in the 1970s, and rests heavily upon these twentieth-century deci2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently arrived at this conclusion in
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert denied 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (indirect assistance to
sectarian schools, by way of state income tax deduction for tuition and other
expenses, does not violate the Establishment Clause).
4.
5.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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sions' account of the Virginia version of Establishment Clause
history.
I.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT AID

Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Mueller v. Allen,6
upholding state income tax deductions for school expenses typically associated with private, sectarian schools, the distinction
between direct and indirect aid has been crucial to the voucher
battle. Direct aid, presumptively forbidden, involves a transfer of
funds from the government treasury to the coffers of religious
institutions without passing through the* hands of any citizenintermediaries. If a state or local government were simply to
make an unrestricted cash distribution of $X per enrolled pupil
to each accredited school within its jurisdiction, the payments to
sectarian schools made under such a program would constitute
violations of current Establishment Clause principles. In particular, such aid would be held to either (a) impermissibly advance
the school's religious mission, or (b) impermissibly involve the
state's agents in monitoring to be sure that no such state-supported religious advancement occurred.7 If, on the other hand,
state or local government makes available to families with children a benefit which may be deployed by the family in favor of a
religious institution, Mueller suggests that such an arrangement
would not violate the Clause. Family-directed aid, even if it has
its source in state largesse, benefits religion as the result of private rather than government choice.'
6. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
7. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (use of public monies for purchases of instructional materials and
equipment for nonpublic schools unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975) (statute authorizing loan of materials to nonpublic schools violates
Establishment Clause). None of these cases involved unrestricted cash grants to
parochial schools; all of them assumed that such grants would present clear
violations of the Establishment Clause.
8. The leading case to the contrary-upon which voucher opponents
heavily rely-is Committeefor PublicEducation v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), a 54 decision in which New York's tax credits, rather than deductions, for
parochial school tuition, were held to violate the Establishment Clause, based
primarily on the argument that the tax credits were equivalent to tuition grants
to a class narrowly defined and dominated by parents of parochial school
students. There is real doubt as to whether Nyquist would be decided the same
way today; the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jackson v. Benson distinguished the
New York program invalidated in Nyquist on the ground that the Milwaukee
program was designed to expand school choices for children in public schools,
and therefore did not aid children already in private schools when the program
commenced. See 578 N.W.2d 602, 614 (Wis. 1998), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 466
(1998).
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Accordingly, all voucher plans involve some version of the
mechanics of indirection. For example, in the Milwaukee program recently upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,9 checks
to cover voucher payments are made payable to the parent-custodians of the students, but are physically transmitted to the school
in which the voucher student is enrolled." ° The custodian never
gets possession of the check; upon enrollment of the student, the
custodian simply endorses the check over to the school, which
does have possession. Unsurprisingly, this arrangement, which
effectively involves the joint consent of school and custodian to
effectuate a transfer from state to school, has provoked argument
over whether the transfer should be characterized as direct (and
therefore forbidden) or indirect (and therefore permissible).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rather quickly and easily disposed of the argument that "these precautionary provisions ...
amount[ed] to some type of 'sham' to funnel public funds to
sectarian private schools."1 1 The court emphasized the crucial
question was "not to ascertain the path upon which public funds
travel ...
path . .

but rather to determine who ultimately chooses that
. [N]ot one cent flows from the State to a sectarian

private school ... except as a result of the necessary and intervening choices of individual parents."1 2 Accordingly, the court
concluded, the program cannot be reasonably viewed as an
endorsement of religion. 3
However convincing the direct-indirect distinction may be,' 4
few members of the Supreme Court have ever been persuaded by
9. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 602.
10. See id. at 609, 618.
11. Id. at 618.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. As a matter of constitutional policy, there is definitely more to be said
for the indirect-direct distinction than the narrow, precedent-oriented
approach of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Direct aid to religious institutions
presents dangers less forcefully present than aid controlled by individual
choice. First, direct aid tends to favor large religious organizations, with an
existing structure of schools, over smaller and more decentralized sects.
Second, direct aid is far more likely than its indirect counterpart to be
"captured" by the institution's capital expenditure plans; when direct aid fuels
capital spending, the likelihood of increased institutional dependence on the
state grows. Third, aid funneled through individuals is more likely to produce
dynamics of change. Certainly, in a generalized system in which vouchers are
made available to all, new schools (sectarian and otherwise) are more likely
over time to come into being. When parents can vote the state's money with
their children's feet, pre-existing systems of religious education have no
political advantage over the long term.
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it. The Mueller v. Allen' 5 Court was divided 54, and the dissenters
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) opposed
both direct and indirect aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools.' 6 A number of other Justices, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, have seemed approving of most forms of both
direct and indirect aid.' 7 At the time of Mueller, Justices Powell
and Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger were the only members of
the Court who found the distinction dispositive. On today's
Court, there is reason to believe that four Justices (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg) strenuously oppose direct aid, and
have their doubts about indirect aid,' 8 that Justices Scalia and
Thomas,' 9 and ChiefJustice Rehnquist would permit many forms
of both direct and indirect aid, and that only Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy might be tempted to draw lines on this basis.
Whatever the merits of this way of looking at these issues, few
Justices (albeit those with swing votes) have ever believed that
this was the key to the problem.
In the end, the argument about "directness" of voucher aid,
frequently characterized in terms of form and substance (i.e., the
vouchers are "really" direct aid even though they have some of
the form of indirect aid), cannot be resolved on its own terms."°
This is so because the direct-indirect distinction is completely
insensitive to the degree of state constraint on private choice.
When the state pays its employees a wage, they can spend the
money for any lawful purpose, including for the advancement of
religion. In such circumstances, the state cannot be held responsible for any religious benefit arising from the unfettered spend15.
16.

463 U.S. 388 (1983).
Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens,

JJ., dissenting).
17.

See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973)
(White,J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 660 (1971) (White,J.,
dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 863 (1995) (Souter,J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,

JJ.).
19. Id. at 852 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has repeatedly
expressed his disagreement with Lemon. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

20. The voucher debate would not be the first in which distinctions
concerning directness and indirectness proved constitutionally unhelpful. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (rejecting
approach of direct vs. indirect consequences in measuring the reach of the
federal Commerce power).
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ing choices of its employees. By contrast, when the state
constrains the benefit in certain ways-for example, a state
income tax deduction for all charitable contributions-the
probability and forseeability of a boost to religion are markedly
increased. Contemporary voucher programs tend to constrain
yet further, limiting parents to the mix of participating schools,
in which sectarian institutions will be heavily represented, at least
in the short run. Even with a private choice mechanism, this sectarian predominance among school choices presents a pressing
question about the constitutionality of school vouchers.
II.

THE SEARCH FOR NEUTRALITY

As suggested at the end of Part I, aid to religious institutions
is on safer constitutional footing when it is folded into a larger,
more inclusive category of beneficiaries.2 1 Aid to religious institutions alone, even if channeled through individuals, carries the
strong appearance of government intent to advance the cause of
religion qua religion. Aid to a more general group of private
hospitals, post-secondary schools, or family service agencies, even
if these classifications include religious enterprises, is much more
readily viewed as government support for a social purpose
independent of religion. This way of considering the problem is
revealing; it suggests that government objectives, rather than policy consequences, are constitutionally controlling. Even in a religion-neutral scheme with a broad beneficiary class, tax
exemptions, government subsidies, and government services will
put religious institutions in a better position than they would be
in the absence of such government largesse.
That the consequential advancement of religious institutions
is not constitutionally fatal in and of itself creates several puzzles.
First, it leaves unexplained why direct aid to sectarian elementary
and secondary schools should be forbidden when that aid falls
within a larger, neutral category of aid to all schools. Second,
and closely related to the first, it leaves unasked a crucial question about the meaning of neutrality. The conception of neutrality upon which the pro-aid position depends is formal; so long as
the category of beneficiary institutions is drawn to include nonreligious and religious institutions, formal neutrality is satisfied.
Critics of this approach, however, focus upon the substantive distribution achieved in fact by such programs; if the great bulk of
beneficiaries are religious institutions, the critics believe we
21. Virtually all of the Justices seem to subscribe to this theme. See, e.g.,
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Rosenberger,515
U.S. at 819; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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should pierce the veil of formality and view the22program as substantively nonneutral and therefore forbidden.
As some scholars have emphasized, constitutional neutrality
might be understood in very different terms than those
presented by a debate about the formal description of the beneficiary category. One alternative approach emphasizes the behavioral incentives created by state policy; its advocates argue that
neutrality should entail that the state not create incentives for or
against religious choice. 23 The combination of compulsory education and free public schools creates powerful incentives to parents to select a secular option. 24 An incentive-focused theory of
neutrality suggests that aid to sectarian schools is constitutionally
required, and at the very least, constitutionally permitted.
A third, quite contrary approach to neutrality proceeds by
redescribing the baseline from which neutrality is calculated.
Voucher opponents argue that the provision of free secular education, long established by custom and practice in the United
States, should be viewed as the baseline condition, departures
from which are seen as nonneutral. On this view, vouchers can
be seen as creating new, impermissible incentives to choose religious education instead of the secular, baseline alternative.2 5
22. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
23. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Towards Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
For an unusual and
provocative slice through the question of neutrality, see Michael W. McConnell,
The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REv.
989 (1991).
24. If extended to fields beyond those in which participation is
compelled, the incentive neutrality theory has radical consequences. To thus
extend the theory's premises is to require state financing of the religious variant
of every enterprise of which there is a free or lower-than-market cost option
provided by government. Universities, mental hospitals, cemeteries, family
service organizations, and many more enterprises have public sector and
religious parallels. To go down this road is to burden government with
multiple financing obligations, or to drive the government entirely out of
various enterprises. A commitment to incentive neutrality thus might foster an
odd and dramatic transformation from a state of affairs in which government
could not aid religious institutions to one in which the obligation to avoid
disincentives to religious choice proves so overwhelming as to usher in the
night watchman state.
25. See Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62
U. CIN. L. REv. 37, 72-73 (1993). A different approach to the problem is
offered in Kathleen Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares, and Voucher Payments:
Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 243 (1996). Professor
Sullivan argues that elementary and secondary education are forms of
government speech (even if privately delivered) because of compulsory
attendance and state regulation of curriculum. From this premise, she
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Because the substantial majority of participating schools in the
Milwaukee system are sectarian schools, 26 the operation of the
Milwaukee voucher system can be characterized as creating
incentives to choose sectarian education over its secular counterparts, public or private.
Notice the difficulties of this latter argument for the nonneutrality of vouchers. Its measuring stick is laid against departures from free secular education. But why should existing
institutions of this sort establish a state of affairs used to measure
neutrality? The current system of property tax exemptions for
charitable uses includes religious uses; if the current system did
not, would we think that a system of tax exemptions for secular
charity was constitutionally neutral toward religion? Or would we
see what would seem plain-that is, that our existing structures
sharply preferred the nonreligious to the religious? To put it differently, in such a world, the baseline would be pro-secular nonneutrality, and every attempt to equalize the benefits between
religious and secular institutions would be viewed as a nonneutral favoring of religion.27
Moreover, if free secular education is to be accepted as the
baseline, the question remains as to how to characterize the
change of affairs implemented by a voucher system like Milwaukee's. In static terms, the current profile of private schools eligible to participate in the voucher program suggests that some
voucher students are being moved toward religion; roughly
three-quarters of the participating schools are sectarian.2 8 Two
additional elements of the story, however, need to be factored
concludes that government need not and may not finance religious education
at the elementary and secondary level. For a comprehensive general statement

of the view that secularity enjoys a constitutionally privileged position, see
Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992).
For a sharp rejoinder to Professor Sullivan, see Michael McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 133 (1992) ("To permit religious
choices only at the cost of forfeiting an equal share in public goods is not
freedom of religion.").
26. Of the 122 private schools eligible to participate in the Milwaukee
program, eighty-nine are sectarian. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 619
n.17 (Wis. 1998). Nevertheless, the court in Jackson held the system as a whole

to be neutral, because voucher-eligible students had a choice among sectarian
voucher schools, nonsectarian voucher schools, and free public schools in
Milwaukee. See id. at 617-19.
27. The United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenbergerplainly reject this proposition in favor of its exact opposite-that
is, the exclusion of religious perspectives from certain government subsidies is
forbidden by the Constitution. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 828-37; Lamb's Chape4

508 U.S. at 393-95.
28.

See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619.
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into the analysis. First, the possibility of dynamic change over
time in the composition of participating schools may move the
incentive effects back toward neutral. As the quantity and quality
of secular private schools increase, the religious incentives in the
scheme decrease; put differently, otherwise identical voucher
neutral, depending
programs will be more or less religiously
29
upon the mix of available schools.
Second, the incentive effects will differ depending upon the
extent to which parents desire their children to participate in the
program of religious instruction at a given sectarian school. The
Milwaukee program forbids participating schools from requiring
religious studies or activities by voucher students.3 ° On the Milwaukee facts, the religious incentives (as compared to the educational incentives) to choose sectarian schools may be very weak,
nonexistent, or even slightly negative, and the religious consequences may be slender indeed.3 1
In the end, arguments about neutrality are unsatisfying and
unresolvable. Voucher proponents believe that free public
schools represent non-neutral favoring of irreligion, and voucher
opponents believe that vouchers nonneutrally favor religion.
Both may be right, but only because they view the problem from
their own, contested vantage point. What is undeniable, however, is that the current structure of Religion Clause law, which
leads to the lingering constitutional doubts about vouchers, is
asymmetrical. On the "rights side"-that is, with respect to issues
29.

When aid is indirect, current law precludes this mix from affecting

the constitutional outcome. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) ("We

would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially
neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of
private citizens claimed benefits under the law.").
30. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609.
31. A report on the Milwaukee program asserts that almost three-quarters
of the participants have been African-American. See LaFollette Public Affairs
Report, (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/outreach/pubs/
fifthyear/report.htm>. Nationwide, one-quarter of Catholic school students are
non-white (African-American, Hispanic-American, Asian-American)

and one-

half of these are non-Catholic. See David Baker & Cornelius Riordan, The
"Eliting"of the Common American Catholic School and the National Education Crisis,

PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1998, at 16. Most of the Hispanic students in Catholic
schools are Catholic; most of the African-American students in Catholic schools
are not. SeeJOHN J. CONVEY, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS MAKE A DIFFERENCE: 25 YEARS
OF RESEARCH 42 (1992); see also ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND
THE COMMON GOOD 69 (1993); Douglas Laycock, Toward a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1387-88 n.119 (1981). To the extent that
the Milwaukee program funneled Protestant African-Americans to Catholic
schools, the religious disincentives may have outweighed the religious
incentives for family choice of a particular school.
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of leaving families free to choose among market alternatives for
educating their children, the existing legal framework is scrupulously neutral between religious and nonreligious schools. If one
can afford sectarian school, one can find and buy that option,
and the state may not eliminate it. 2 On the "benefits side," however-that is, the body of Establishment Clause principles governing the distribution of state largesse-the current law favors
secular institutions by its restrictiveness on state assistance to religious institutions performing comparable functions.
Moreover, this asymmetry has over time been narrowed
almost entirely to the field of elementary and secondary education. The state may give grants to church programs for educating adolescents on matters of sexuality and pregnancy, so long as
the programs are not religiously oriented.3" The state may provide grants to colleges and universities, so long as they are not
"pervasively sectarian," for secular educational purposes, 4 and
the state may help finance buildings on the campuses of religiously affiliated colleges, so long as the school promises not to
use these buildings for sectarian purposes.3 5 Most recently and
stunningly, the Supreme Court has held that state universities
that finance journals of student opinion must include journals
with a religious perspective. 36 Tuition vouchers at the college
and university level have existed for years, and these programs
routinely include sectarian schools. 7
To put it more starkly, the area of financing elementary and
secondary education is a constitutional anomaly, and growing
more so with each Supreme Court term. The Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Agostini v. Felton,"8 overruling its decade-old deci32. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
34. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976). Roemer
played a prominent part in the Fourth Circuit's recent decision to remand a
lower court ruling, upholding a grant denial, for further findings on the issue
of whether a particular college is "pervasively sectarian," a finding which will
disqualify a post-secondary school from state assistance. See Columbia Union
College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
35. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971).
36. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819.
37. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986). New York State has for many years operated its Regents Scholarship
program, which provides tuition vouchers to New York residents attending instate colleges and universities, including religiously affiliated ones. See N.Y.
EDuC. LAw §§ 601, 605a (McKinney 1998).
38. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar and declaring the
permissibility of providing remedial education delivered by public employees
on site at sectarian schools). For a critique of Agostini and an attempt to
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sion in Aguilar v. Felton,3 9 has only exacerbated the confusion in
the field, as any follower of lower court decisions on aid to sectarian schools can confirm.4 ° Are there arguments from earlier precedent, or from original constitutional history, that may help
explain this difference in treatment between these financing
questions and others, which on the surface seem
indistinguishable?
III.

THE CRUMBLING ARGUMENT FROM PRECEDENT-EVERSON,
LEMON, AND THEIR PROGENY

All of the doctrinal machinery, discussed above, that focuses
on neutrality and indirectness of aid is driven by the strictures
contained in the line of Supreme Court decisions from Everson
(1948) to Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) and their progeny from the
197 0s. These cases, all of which but Everson involve direct aid to
elementary and secondary schools, reflect state attempts to aid
an overwhelmingly Catholic set of private schools.41 Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Everson,42 and Chief Justice Burger's
opinion for the Court in Lemon,4 3 are open and conspicuous
tracts about the pervasive religious indoctrination thought to
accompany the system of Catholic education. The principles
generated by these two cases rest entirely upon judicial perceptions of the utter inseparability of religion from education in the
settings of such schools. Catholic education is held out by Justice
Jackson as the engine that fuels intergenerational transmission of
the faith, and Chief Justice Burger similarly emphasizes the
rehabilitate a strong version of the no-aid principle, see Gary Mozer, Note, The
Crumbling Wall Between Church and State: Agostini v. Felton, Aid to Parochial
Schools, and the Establishment Clause in the Twenty-First Century, 31 CONN. L. REv.

337 (1998).
39. 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that the provision of remedial
education by public employees on site at sectarian schools violates the
Establishment Clause).
40. For good illustrations of the difficulties lower courts have had in
applying the conflicting welter of Supreme Court decisions in this area, see
Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998); Walker v. San Francisco Unified
School District,46 F.3d 1449 (1995); see also Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159
F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998). In each of these three cases, the courts of appeals

struggled with questions arising from the Supreme Court's inconsistent
precedents and recent but incomplete movement in the direction of the
permissibility of aid.
41. The transportation assistance to families of schoolchildren, at issue in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), was explicitly limited by local
resolution to public school students and Catholic school students.
42. See id. at 18-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
43. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-25 (1971). See also id. at
625-42 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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degree, pervasiveness, and missionary sweep of Catholic elementary and secondary education. These are inquiries into the sociology of a particular faith, and arguably prejudiced ones at that,
masquerading as an inquiry into the meaning of the
Constitution.
The Protestant paranoia fueled by waves of Catholic immigration to the U.S., beginning in the mid-nineteenth century,
cannot form the basis of a stable constitutional principle," and
the stability of the principle has been undermined by the amelioration of those concerns. From the advent of publicly supported,
compulsory education until very recently, aid to sectarian schools
primarily meant aid to Catholic schools as an enterprise to rival
publicly supported, essentially Protestant schools. But the antiCatholic prejudice that drove this aspect of separationism has
been progressively undermined in the last forty years. The election of John Kennedy was among the key ingredients of the
change, as was the increased consciousness of prejudice that the
civil rights movement provoked. The pronouncement of the
church itself, in Vatican II's Declaration of Religious Freedom, in
favor of religious liberty for all and church-state separation in the
modern world, helped reassure non-Catholics that the church
was no longer engaged in a campaign to dominate secular
institutions.4"
The suburbanization and upward mobility of American
Catholics has also been a major contributing force;4 6 as Catholics
have left inner cities, the bastions of parish schools, they have
become less inclined toward traditional participation in the
Church, including educating their children in the prescribed sectarian way.47 As a result of this migration, Catholic schools in the
inner cities have been forced to become more ecumenical in
their approach in order to attract enough students, a significant
44. The best documentation and analysis of this phenomenon will soon
be forthcoming in my colleague Philip Hamburger's work on separation of
church and state. See also Steven K Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36
AMER. J. LEG. HIsT. 38 (1992).
45. BRYK ET AL., supra note 31, at 49-50.
46. On suburbanization of Catholics, see Rosalind Rossi, "Success-Failure
Story" of Catholic Schools, CHI. SuN-TIMES, (Jan. 21, 1997) at 12; Steve Berg,
CatholicEducation; How Do Catholic Schools Do It ?, MINNEAPOLIs STAR TRIB., April
1, 1997 at 1A. On upward mobility, see Baker & Riordan, supra note 31, at 16.
For a wider-angle lens on changes in Catholic schools over the period from
1960 to 1990, see BRYK ET AL., supra note 31.
47. See Baker & Riordan, supra note 31, at 16. See also BRYK ET AL., supra
note 31, at 33 (Catholic school enrollment fell from a high of 5.5 million, or
12% of the school-age population, in 1965, to 2.5 million, or 5.4% of the
school-age population, in 1990.).
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number of whom are non-Catholic, to survive.4 8 When Lemon
was decided in 1971, less than three percent of the students in
Catholic elementary and secondary schools were not of the
Roman Catholic faith;49 by the late 1990s, that percentage had
quadrupled."0
Simultaneously, the rise of evangelical Protestant movements in America, the tendency among many American Jews to
choose sectarian education, and the inclination among various
immigrant groups to emphasize parochial education all have
stimulated the creation of non-Catholic sectarian schools and a
corresponding demand among non-Catholics for government
policies supportive of religious education. At the time of Lemon,
65% of all private schools and 75% of all sectarian schools in the
United States were Roman Catholic schools, and these schools
contained 90% of all the pupils then enrolled in sectarian
schools.5 1 In Lemon, the Court tells us, "more than 96% of [the
Pennsylvania students who would have benefitted from the aid
program] attend church-related schools, and most of these
schools are affiliated with the Roman Catholic church."5 2 In Earley v. DiCenso,53 a case from Rhode Island decided as a companion to Lemon, 95% of the pupils benefitted by the aid program
attended Roman Catholic schools. 54 In Wolman v. Walter,5 5 the
parties stipulated that, in 1974-75, 691 of 720 nonpublic schools
in the state were sectarian, and "more than 92% [of the nonpublic school enrollment] attended Catholic schools."5 6
By sharp contrast, in 1995-96, Catholic schools represented
only 29.8% of the private elementary and secondary schools in
48. Non-Catholic enrollment in Catholic schools quintupled between
1970 (2.6%) and 1983 (14.3%). See BRYK ET AL., supra note 31, at 69. See also
CONVEY, supra note 31, at 41; MARv Jo METZLER, NATIONAL CATHOLIC EDUC.
Assoc., U.S. CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1997-98, at 16
(1998). Laycock, supra note 31, at 1387-88 n.119.
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50. The most recent survey by the National Catholic Education
Association puts non-Catholic enrollment in Catholic schools at 13.6%. See
METZLER, supra note 48, at 16.
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the United States,5 7 and their enrollment represented 50.1% of
the students enrolled at such schools.58 Because many students
now enrolled at Catholic schools are non-Catholic,5 9 nonCatholics probably now represent the majority of students
enrolled in sectarian schools in the United States.
If the line of decisions from Everson to Lemon was driven substantially by the then-demographics of public and private education, coupled with anti-Catholic animus, what remains to justify
principles forbidding direct aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools? For me, the key to this inquiry lies in the Virginia history upon which Justices Black and Rutledge so famously
and heavily relied in Everson. The historical episode that, according to the Everson Justices; crystallized the constitutional no-aid
principle now embodied in the Establishment Clause, involved
the 1784 proposal in Virginia for a "Bill Establishing a Provision
for Teachers of the Christian Religion" (hereinafter "the Bill").
After the State of Virginia suspended the requirement of tithing
to the formally established Anglican Church in 1777, the 1784
proposal was designed to broaden and reassert state authority to
tax for the support of Christianity. The Bill provided:6"
Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge
hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men,
restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society;
which cannot be effected without a competent provision
for learned teachers . ..
Be it therefore enacted . . [T]hat for the support of
Christian teachers . . . [a property tax] is hereby assessed
.

...

[and each taxpayer shall express to the tax collec-

tor] to what society of Christians [the taxpayer directs] the
money to be paid.., and [the tax collector shall pay to the
appropriate representative] of each such society, the sum
so stated to be due to that society ....
And be it further enacted, That the money to be
raised by virtue of this Act, shall be by the Vestries, Elders,
or Directors of each religious society, appropriated to a
provision for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel of their
57.

See

STEPHEN

P.

BROUGHAM

AND LENORE

A.

COLACIELLO,

NATIONAL

CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY,

at 5 tbl.1 (1998) [hereinafter

1995-96,

NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS].

58. See id. at 8 tbl.4.
59. See sources cited supra note 48.
60. The Bill is included as part of the Appendix to Justice Rutledge's
dissent in Everson. 330 U.S. at 72-74.
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denomination, or to providing places of divine worship,
and to none other use whatsoever; except in the denomi[who may dispose
nations of Quakers and Menonists ....
of the funds] in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote their particular mode of worship.
And be it enacted, That all sums [not earmarked for
particular societies of Christians] shall be . . . disposed
of . . . for the encouragement of seminaries of learning
within the Counties whence such sums shall arise ....
Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance6" vigorously
advocated against the enactment of the Bill, and it was soon
defeated. A key element in the Bill's failure, not apparent from
its text or from the Memorial and Remonstrance, was its significance in the Virginia struggle to disestablish the Anglican
Church. Viewed only on its face, however, the Bill had certain
critical features which should be recalled in any attempt to generate first principles from the Virginia history.
First, and most obviously, the Bill was limited to support of
the Christian religion. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing in
support of jettisoning the "wall of separation" metaphor, recognized that this feature of the Virginia history should be viewed as
forever settling the proposition that the state may not enact sectarian preferences.6 2
Second, the tax proposed by the Bill was not designed to
augment general revenues. Rather, the Bill included a tax
earmarked for this particular purpose. Whether one was supporting a sect in which one was active or not, one's tax contribution was being segregated to particular sectarian use. This is a
symbolically and psychologically important feature of the
arrangement. If one were subject to the tax, one could not say
(as modern taxpayers do) that one is supporting the government
generally without necessarily approving of all of the government's programs. Rather, under an earmarked tax scheme, the
feel of the arrangements is involuntary support of a religious
sect, even if the taxpayer gets to designate which one. This
aspect of the Virginia tax highlighted its establishmentarian character and clashed with theological presuppositions, shared by

61. The Memorial and Remonstrance is printed in the Appendix to the
dissent of Justice Rutledge in Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72.
62. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Madison and others, that support for religion (not government)
must be voluntary.6 3
Third, the Virginia scheme against which Madison protested
was not aimed at supporting existing schools and their instructional personnel. Rather, the monies were to be spent by those
in charge of religious communities for "provision of a Minister or
Teacher of the Gospel of their denomination, or to providing
places of divine worship."'
The funds could thus be used to
build churches, without any provision whatsoever for education
of the young. To be sure, the scheme permitted taxpayers to designate their payments for "the encouragement of seminaries of
learning within [their respective] Counties,"65 but, despite this
nod to Jeffersonian sentiment, 66 no such institutions existed at
the time. 67 Taxpayers thus could devote their payments to religious sects or to a set of future institutions which might never
come into being. As a consequence of the taxpayer choices for
which there were the greatest and most immediate incentives,
the Virginia assessment scheme would have directly and immediately aided sects and their clergy in their religious mission.
Fourth, the education expected in the arrangements that
would have been subsidized by the Virginia Bill was rudimentary
at best. The Bible would have been the text of central impor63. As Madison stated in the Memorial and Remonstrance: "We
remonstrate against the said Bill, 1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and
undeniable truth, that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator... can
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence." 330 U.S. at
64 (quoting THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI). In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610 (1971), the Court remarked that the funds for the
challenged aid to nonpublic schools, predominantly Catholic, were "originally
derived from a new tax on horse and harness racing, but.., now [are] financed
by a portion of the state tax on cigarettes." This sort of "vice tax" may well have
been designed to undercut claims that the scheme coerced involuntary support
of religion, but the Court did not offer a view of the constitutional significance
of the chosen taxing device.
64. 330 U.S. at 73. Quakers and Menonists were permitted to spend the
funds "in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote their
particular mode of worship." Id.
65. Id. at 74.
66. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 146-48
(William Peden ed., 1995) (proposing non-sectarian public schools in each
Virginia county).
67. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY, RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 26 (1986). Although wealthy Virginians hired private
tutors for their children, and other, middle-class Virginians of the 1780s
purchased some basic educational instruction for their children, there were no
publicly supported, free elementary or secondary schools at that time. See
ROBERT E. BROWN & B. KATHERINE BROWN, VIRGINIA 1705-1786: DEMOCRACY OR
ARISTOCRACY? 271-83 (1964).
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tance, and the educational emphasis would have been primarily
on religious virtue, and secondarily on basic reading, writing and
arithmetic.6" Put in today's terminology, the "secular value" of
such an education would have been fairly small, and the religious
value large by comparison.
Our educational and legal circumstances in the twentieth
century are dramatically different, in ways that cast enormous
doubt on any principle barring direct financial assistance, for secular educational purposes, to state-accredited sectarian schools.
First, as Brown v. Board of Education6 9 emphasized, the role of education in the twentieth century is vastly different from what it was
in the eighteenth. Education is the road to individual mobility
and society-wide progress on every front. If long-entrenched and
customary segregation yielded to such changes, why shouldn't
the long-imposed restrictions on aid to sectarian schools similarly
respond? Under Plessy v. Ferguson,7 ° racially separate was at least
supposed to be equal; under Everson and Lemon, separate inevitably means unequal with respect to possibilities of state support.
Second, as described above, the mix of sectarian schools in
America bears absolutely no resemblance to the world of colonial
Virginia, in which nothing resembling an elementary or secondary educational institution of today ever appeared. According
to the most recent survey by the U.S. Department of Education, 7
sectarian schools now represent a wonderfully pluralistic assortment of religious affiliations. Although Catholic schools still represent a plurality, at slightly under 30%,72 that percentage has

dropped dramatically since the time of Lemon, when Catholic
schools represented 75% of religiously affiliated schools. 73 Sectarian schools are now operated in substantial numbers by a wide
variety of Protestant Christians, by Greek Orthodox, Islamic, and
Jewish communities, and by many others. 4 This mix suggests
that government aid to sectarian schools will not produce the
68. See MILLER, supra note 67, at 27-29 (explaining that religious virtue
was the objective of the assessment bill); BROWN & BROWN, note 67, at 277-78
(describing the practical emphasis of education for most children in
eighteenth-century Virginia).
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70.
71.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 57 passim.

72. See id. at 6 tbl.2.
73. In 1970-71, of the 14,270 religiously affiliated elementary and
secondary schools, 10,770 were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. See
GERTLER & BARKER, supra note 51, at 6 tbl.C.
74. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 57, at 6 tbl.2.
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Protestant versus Catholic political divisions that so worried prior
generations.75
Third, no contemporary proposal for school vouchers or
direct subsidies to private schools would be likely to rely on
earmarked taxes. Rather, the state would inevitably rely upon a
portion of some more generally available source of revenue. As a
consequence, taxpayers would not have the experience proposed
for eighteenth-century Virginians of designating tax payments to
a particular sect. Instead, today's taxpayers would make their
payments and understand, as is always and everywhere the case,
that some appropriated monies would be spent on purposes and
projects with which some do not agree.
Fourth, contemporary regimes of education are inevitably
characterized by processes and standards of government accreditation. Unlike the situation in early America, all states have compulsory education laws, and accreditation is the key to school
survival; attendance at unaccredited schools will not satisfy those
laws. Accordingly, government will retain control over the activities of sectarian schools. Voucher programs and any direct state
financing will only serve to increase the demand for, and the likelihood of, such regulation.
The battle over state support for religion in late eighteenthcentury Virginia makes a great story, but it has little to do with
education in the United States in the next millennium. If a state
were once again to expend monies for the support of the clergy
and places of divine worship, such a measure would be clearly
prohibited by the Establishment Clause. But the maintenance of
such a prohibition on contemporary attempts at widening the
choices available to parents of schoolchildren, through mechanisms of public finance, cannot be sustained for much longer.
IV.

ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE.

In the Supreme Court, the pressures in the direction of
undoing the regime of Lemon are unmistakable, though the steps
have been incremental and the judicial arguments for rejecting
Lemon have not been tied to the Virginia history and the distance
we have come from it. But the key decisions moving away from
the no-aid principle have frequently involved 5-4 splits,7 6 and
75.

For the argument that contemporary voucher programs will continue

to produce an unhealthy dynamic of religious interest groups interacting with
government officials, see Marci Hamilton, Vouchers, The Establishment Clause, and
Power, 31 CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999).
76. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Rosenbergerinvolved in-kind aid
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have provoked passionate dissents.7 7 So there is no promise,
much less a guarantee, that the constitutional restrictions on
direct funding of elementary and secondary education conducted by religious institutions are about to disappear. The
recent denial of certiorariin the
Milwaukee voucher case has only
7a
highlighted this uncertainty.
Two key constitutional issues remain in the effort to remove
the barriers to public funding of sectarian schools. The first, arising on the Establishment Clause side, involves the need for an
adequate conception of severability of religious and secular components of sectarian education. The central premises in the
regime of Lemon are (1) that elementary and secondary sectarian
schools are pervasively religious, (2) that the minors being educated in them are highly vulnerable to indoctrination, and (3)
that aid to such schools will inevitably advance the faith. And to
some extent it will. But it will simultaneously advance the secular
goals these schools achieve and upon which their accreditation
depends.
Should the inevitably religious component of much of sectarian education serve to disqualify such schools from direct state
assistance? Lemon's presumptions that it should, that state aid
must therefore be monitored to ensure that the state pays for no
religious instruction, and that such monitoring itself p resents the
constitutional problem of "excessive entanglement," lies at the
heart of the current prohibition on direct aid. Several recent
decisions, however, have begun to undermine rather directly
some of these premises. In Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District,8 ° the Supreme Court ruled that the Establishment Clause
presents no bar to the provision of a state-provided hearing interpreter to a hearing-disabled boy in a pervasively sectarian Cathoto students publishing a religious journal, but did not involve aid to a religious
institution. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-27. Agostini involved aid to a
religious institution, but the aid was in the form of public employees teaching
secular subjects. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-13.
77. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting).

78. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W. 2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 466 (1998). The lower courts, clinging to the ancient regime on these
matters, appear not to be ready to predict and pioneer a breakthrough. See
Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998). Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Agostini essentially ordered the lower courts not to anticipate
yet unrealized changes in Establishment Clause law. 521 U.S. at 541.
79. Scholars have often and appropriately mocked this feature of the
doctrine. See, e.g., John Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, 1985 Sup.
CT. REv. 61, 87-89.
80. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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lic school. That the interpreter would translate religion class and
pre-school Mass-both required elements of education at that
school-as well as secular subjects did not alter the result. A severability requirement in such a setting, limiting the interpreter to
translating secular subjects only, would have effectively made it
impossible for the student to attend a school with a serious religion program. Accordingly, the incidental benefit to his religious training did not serve to disqualify him from the service of
the interpreter and its obvious secular value.
More dramatically, the decision in Rosenberger to forbid a
state university from excluding ajournal of opinion with a Christian perspective from a group of state-subsidized studentjournals
bespeaks an even firmer determination to reject a requirement
of severability for state-aided enterprises with both secular and
religious components. That the students in Rosenbergerusedtheir
magazine as a tool to proselytize did not render it any less a vehicle for teaching students how to read, write, think, and edit an
intellectual journal.
The approach to severability suggested by Zobrest and Rosenberger may go a long way toward the undoing of Lemon and its
premises. When state efforts that incidentally advance religion
involve activities that can readily be separated into secular and
religious components, the state should be limited to support for
the secular only. State sponsorship of the Ten Commandments,
for example, is unconstitutional because the first several Commandments are entirely religious in their content;8 1 if a state
wants to promote those Commandments that form the backdrop
of our criminal law and a number of our ethical commitments,
those in Exodus 20:13-16 should suffice.8 2 By contrast, state celebration of the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr. is acceptable
constitutionally because his secular achievements deserve their
81. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that the state may
not require the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
classrooms). As a recent essay points out, the precise number and content of
the Commandments is a matter of religious dispute. See Steven Lubet, The Ten
Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT 471 (1998). No matter how you
assemble and count them, however, Commandments relating to God's identity
and priority, the prohibition on making or bowing to graven images, the
prohibition on taking the Lord's name in vain, and the obligation to honor and
keep holy the Sabbath Day (see Exodus 20:4-9) cannot be understood as
advancing secular objectives.
82. "You shall not murder. You shall not commit adultery. You shall not
steal. You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor." The requirement
of parent honoring, see Exodus 20:12, and the prohibition on coveting, see Exodus
20:14, perhaps can be defended as advancing secular as well as religious
purposes.
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own special attention, and we cannot separate his religious sentiments or vocation from his life and accomplishments. A similar
attitude towards state assistance to accredited sectarian schools
would put an end to the regime of Lemon and its concerns with
non-secular effects; it would no longer matter if mathematics
teachers in sectarian schools advance the faith while simultaneously teaching their secular subject.8" And because such teaching efforts would no longer require monitoring, Lemon's concern
for "excessive entanglement" would disappear.
The second key issue will arise on the free exercise side-to
what extent will legislatures be free to impose, and accrediting
and funding agencies to enforce, requirements of a secular curriculum and nondiscrimination in student admissions or the hiring and retention of school personnel? This has been the
inevitable tradeoff ultimately facing sectarian schools, forestalled
by Lemon's interdiction of the possibility of state assistance. Once
the public begins to finance religious education, the regulatory
concerns about design of curriculum, admissions, policy, and
employment decisions will surface with a vengeance. It is not the
case that financing will authorize such regulation where accreditation did not; rather, state financing will inevitably lead to more
pressure for secular control and secular policies.
In particular, sectarian schools which accept government
funding may well be required to reduce or eliminate discrimination based on faith commitments in selecting students, and perhaps in selecting faculty as well. In turn, a policy of
nondiscrimination among students may lead to state pressure on
schools to make participation in religious instruction and experience voluntary rather than compulsory. That these conditions
are reasonable from the state's perspective, and considerably
diluting of the religious character of the education from the
school's perspective, can hardly be denied. The current shape of
free exercise law, permitting burdens on religion so long as they
are cast in religion-neutral terms, 84 suggests that such conditions

83.

The mathematics taught would have secular value, and could be state-

financed to that extent. Professor Choper made precisely such a suggestion on
the eve of Lemon. SeeJesse Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 265-66 (1968) ("[G]overnmental financial aid
may be extended directly or indirectly to support parochial schools ... so long
as such aid does not exceed the value of the secular educational service
rendered by the school.").
84. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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may well be valid, although there is no shortage of plausible
arguments to the contrary.8 5
The concern about regulatory control over religious schools
of course is not limited to cases of direct aid. Voucher schemes
already present such questions. The Milwaukee program, for
example, forbade the schools from requiring religious instruction for voucher students.8 6 Voucher schemes, however, permit
tailoring of the conditions to the voucher students only; direct
funding schemes would invite such conditions as umbrellas over
the entire school enterprise. Such conditions, even when narrowly tailored to voucher students only, may discourage participation by some schools, but it should be obvious that conditions
aimed only at publicly financed students will be more palatable
and less intrusive than conditions that affect the school as a
whole. For this reason, as well as reasons of lingering constitutional doubt, one should expect to see programs of aid to sectarian schools remain of the voucher type for a long time to come.
What one should not similarly expect is perpetuation of insurmountable constitutional impediments to public financing of
sectarian education.

85. A requirement that religious schools not discriminate on the basis of
religion in choosing faculty and/or students has a profoundly different impact
upon such schools than does the identical requirement imposed upon nonreligious institutions. For sectarian schools, such a requirement impedes their
ability to create a religious community and advance a theological as well as
educational mission. Theological missions, however, are precisely what the
state should not be purposefully subsidizing.
Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, exempts religious
institutions from the ban on religious discrimination in hiring, and the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld this provision against Establishment
Clause challenge in Corporationof PresidingBishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
Whether such an exemption is required by the Free Exercise Clause or any
other provision of the Constitution, however, especially after Smith, is of course
another question. Moreover, leaving religious institutions free to so
discriminate is one thing; subsidizing them financially while they continue to
do so is quite another, because the discrimination may increase the religious
value of the education at the expense of its secular value. The Milwaukee
program prohibited participating voucher schools from engaging in any
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, and forbade
compulsory religious activity for voucher students, but did not forbid religious
selectivity by participating schools. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607-09.
86. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609.

